TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE PROFESSION:
SOME REMARKS ON KAFKA'S THE TRIAL
AND THE SELF
Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: "Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most
important man who takes part in the building of a house." ' For
Holmes, the law was a synthesis of theoretical underpinnings and
practical application. As one prepares to enter the legal profession of
the 1980's, however, one sees little evidence of a harmonious relationship between theory and practice. Today, many law students seem to
sense that theory has become academic: it is essential to legal scholars,
but of little use to the rest of the profession. An approach to legal
problems which focuses solely on a pragmatic result is thought preferable to analyzing such problems in terms of underlying theory. 2 In
fact, a theoretical approach is widely regarded as a luxury affordable
only by those who lack the competence to succeed in practice. 3 According to prevailing student wisdom, the practice of law is a bottomline, result-oriented business to which theory may once have mattered, but is now clearly inapposite.
This perspective must be altered for two basic reasons. First, it
may be a faulty perception of the realities of the legal profession. As
legal analysis involves the practical application of carefully conceived
principles, one who cannot grasp the theory behind the law he practices cannot properly apply such theory. Therefore, theory is essential
to law as it is practiced by lawyers dedicated to professional excellence.

OW. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 200 (1921).

Law reviews reflect these contrasting approaches to legal analysis. Compare Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 781 (1983) with Warren & Auerbach, Tax Policy and Equipment Leasing After TEFRA,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1579 (1983); Arnold, Accident, Mistake, and Rules of Liability in the
Fourteenth Century Law of Torts, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 361 (1979) with Simson, Discrimination
Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article VI, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
379 (1979) and Davis, Critical Jurisprudence:An Essay on the Legal Theory of Robert Burt's
Taking Care of Strangers, 1981 Wls. L. REV. 419 with Schneider, Evolving Proof Standards
Under Section 7 and Mergers in TransitionalMarkets: The Securities Industry Example, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 1.
3 Student rejection of the theoretical approach embraced by many academicians is captured
in the familiar aphorism: "Those who can, do; those who can't, teach." For a cogent analysis of
the friction between law students and their mentors, see generally Margolick, The Trouble With
American Law Schools, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20.
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This perspective must change for a second, far more significant
reason. If the legal profession has become primarily a practical,
money-making venture rather than a highly principled social craft,
this situation must change. It is not going to change if law students
simply tailor their behavior to suit a clouded perception of what is
expected of them. If membership in the legal profession bespeaks
integrity and public service, attorneys must serve the public with
integrity.
With this challenge in mind, the author presents a law student's
impressions as to how one might become a responsible attorney. Specifically, the concern here is with the importance of individual development to both the lawyer and the profession. As classical literature
has long been an instrument of self-awareness, 4 an analysis of Franz
Kafka's The Trial5 highlights this article's thesis. Like much of Kafka's
work, The Trial speaks to and of the self in a manner which urges an
almost too revealing introspection, disquieting yet necessary for all
individuals, particularly lawyers.
Self-development is essential to becoming a responsible attorney.
In this context, self-development refers to the formation of individual
values-beliefs which one holds as the preeminent guide to one's life,
work, and behavior toward others. Such value development does not
occur as a natural incident of birth; it must be actively pursued to be
achieved. The active pursuit of personal values involves serious selfconfrontation-periodic and rigorous questioning of one's own values,
of whether such values are still viable, and if so, of whether one is
really honoring them. This is, of course, a matter of personal choice.
One can choose to develop one's own values, one can subscribe to
group or "collective" values, or one can choose to embrace no values
at all.

I In 1908, recognizing the importance of literature to the law, evidence authority John H.
Wigmore compiled a list of novels of particular significance to lawyers. See Wigmore, A List of
One Hundred Legal Novels, 17 ILL. L. REV. 26 (1922), reprinted with corrections from
Wigmore, A List of Legal Novels, 2 ILL. L. REV. 574 (1908). Wigmore's list was for the most part
comprised of novels directly involving law and lawyers, such as JOSEPH CONRAD'S LORD JIM and
CHARLES DICKENS' BLEAK HOUSE. This list has been twice revised in the past several years. See
Weisberg & Kretschman, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Expanded: A Collaborative Effort, 7 U.
MD. L.F. 94 (1977), revised from Weisberg, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Revisited: New Resourcesfor the Expansive Lawyer, 71 NEV. U.L. REV. 17 (1976). It now includes over 300 titles,
among them works with more subtle connections to the law, such as ANTHONY BURcESS' A
CLOCKWORK ORANGE and RICHARD WRIGHT'S NATIVE SON.
5 F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa and Edwin Muir trans., rev. E.M. Butler, Vintage Books ed.
1969).
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An attorney, however, has surrendered this freedom of choice:
An attorney must develop individual values. The legal profession is an
integral component of American society. It is the corrective sword and
the protective shield, the means of access to a complex system, the
representative voice which resolves conflict. Ideally, it seeks and attains the just result. As servants of the law, attorneys are entrusted
with a vital task. In return for this trust, they are expected to develop
and honor positive professional values. It is by no means certain that
the values each individual attorney views as positive will be consistent
with the ends of justice. Nevertheless, it is clear that justice will be
better served by those who have taken the time and effort to develop
as selves than by those who consciously honor no values whatsoever,
and hence come to embrace values which are thrust upon them.'
Unfortunately, it may be that American law schools foster value
neutrality. 7 The volume of work required of a first year law student is
so great that there may simply be no time to ruminate on individual
values. More significant than the time restraints are the constant
demands made upon the new law student to "think like a lawyer."
This may well be the crux of the problem. To the extent that thinking
like a lawyer involves rational decisionmaking, it is certainly desirable. To the extent, however, that it requires the blanket renunciation
of individual values, it is insidious. 8
No one would deny that legal problems demand the use of reason
rather than emotion. Nevertheless, there are many different ways of
looking at Reason. Viewed in the best light, the use of reason involves
a logical journey to a just result. In this sense, reason is perfectly
compatible with, and in fact demands, carefully developed values.
From the perspective of a student being exposed to the legal system for

6 The basic premise is that confronting one's self and developing personal values is a
worthwhile end in itself. It must be stated, however, that in addition to conveying an existential
message about the self, this writing proceeds from the hopeful yet realistic belief that selfconfrontation will lead to the development of values consistent with societal well-being.
See generally Halpern, On the Politicsand Pathology oj Legal Education (Or, Whatever
Happened to that Blindfolded Lady with the Scales?), 32 J. LEGAL Enuc. 383 (1982); Kennedy,
Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982). The idea
that an educational system could actually foster value neutrality is indeed strange. Equally
curious is the fact that legal education, run for the most part by individuals who have eschewed
practice, somehow conveys an extremely pragmatic view of the law. See Margolick, supra note
3.
8 Duncan Kennedy of Harvard Law School maintains that the art of thinking like a lawyer
taught in law schools is part of a decidedly political process. Specifically, Professor Kennedy
espouses the extreme view that legal education entails "ideological training for willing service in
the hierarchies of the corporate welfare state." Kennedy, supra note 7, at 591.
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the first time, however, the art of reasoning may seem inconsistent
with "pre-legal" values.
New law students are constantly reminded that they must discard
old ways of analyzing problems. This is because even educated individuals who are accustomed to confronting complex questions tend to
answer such questions intuitively, out of a basic sense of fairness,
rather than logically. In their zeal to internalize the law school experience and exercise pure rationality, however, law students may reject
personal values which are perfectly consistent with reason. 9 This is
partially the result of student misunderstanding, and partially the
fault of a system which seems to deemphasize individual value development.10 In an effort to churn out rational attorneys, legal education
may have the ultimate effect of banishing the human factor. What
begins as a quest for reason may well result in value neutrality.
This is a dangerous situation. One's ability to reason is only
complete when it is informed by a firmly rooted value structure.
Certainly, law students have much to learn about analytical thinking,
and about the ways of the legal profession. Nevertheless, aspiring
attorneys also have a contribution to make to the profession. As John
Stuart Mill noted:
Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth
as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being,
See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 594. Kennedy contends that the cases read by first year law
students are either "cold" cases, which are apolitical, amoral, and unemotional, or "hot" cases,
in which a "sympathetic" plaintiff loses to an "unsympathetic" defendant. Students' first reaction
to the hot cases is one of righteous anger. But, Kennedy continues, class discussion of these cases
will lead students to conclude that this "initial reaction of outrage is naive, nonlegal, irrelevant
.. .and may be substantively wrong in the bargain. There are good reasons for the awful result,
when you take a legal and logical large view, as opposed to a knee-jerk passionate view, and if
you can't muster those reasons, maybe you aren't cut out to be a lawyer." Id.
10 See Halpern, supra note 7, at 385. Professor Halpern observes:
The first-year student studies contracts, property, torts, and constitutional law and
finds virtually no attention given to the role of social class, political power, distribution of wealth, and their respective influences on the substantive law in all those
fields. The omission of such factors speaks volumes to the student. He learns that
professional norms are such for attorneys that to conceive of law in these terms is
unlawyerly and unprofessional. He soon understands that law professors, judges,
lawyers, and presumably good law students do not think in this way. The student
must then unlearn what any thinking layman readily recognizes-that law is a form
of authority which, among other things-preserves the gross inequality in our society.
Id.
The fear of value erosion in law schools which is expressed in this paper does not demand the
exact perspective of either Halpern or Kennedy. Whatever the current state of the law, its future
is in the hands of the legal profession. It is with this in mind that the author urges the
development of individualistic values and the exercise of a rationality informed by such values.
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arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. . . . The human faculties of perception,
judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral
preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does
anything because it is the custom makes no choice. He gains no
practice either in discerning or desiring what is best. The mental
and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being
.
1
used. ....
Mill speaks directly to the lawyers and law students of the 1980's.
Although it is essential to think rationally-in this sense to think like a
lawyer-it is equally important to bring one's values to bear upon the
legal profession. When this is done the profession will benefit from the
input of its membership. This point cannot be overemphasized in law
schools. Clearly, a lawyer must be both reasonable and value-oriented.
In 1859, Mill warned that society had gotten the better of individuality, and admonished that "the danger which threatens human
nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and
preferences."1 2 The same danger currently threatens the legal profession. If this deficiency is to be corrected, individual lawyers and law
students must confront themselves and develop personal values which
will enable them to approach legal problems as both rational and
human beings.
Franz Kafka's The Trial explores the horrible consequences of
one man's failure to develop as a self. The protagonist, Joseph K., is
an ordinary man content with slow but steady advancement in his
position at a local bank. The invasion of K's uneventful life gives rise
to the novel, which begins: "Someone must have traduced Joseph K.,
for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine
morning."'13 Suddenly, on his thirtieth birthday, K.'s perception of
perfect order in the world is disturbed: he has done nothing wrong,
yet is being accused. "Who could these men be? What were they
talking about? What authority could they represent? K. lived in a
country with a legal constitution, there was universal peace, all the
4
laws were in force; who dared seize him in his own dwelling?"1
Speaking in K.'s voice, Kafka reveals the perspective of his central character: K. has faith in the world around him, and in his own

" J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Norton
12
13

Id. at 57-58.
F. KAFKA, supra note 5, at 3.

11 Id. at 7.

ed. 1975), at 55.
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freedom within that world. He is surprised and indignant at the
arbitrary invasion of his right to live in peace. When he questions this
invasion, K. is told that the "officials, . . . as the Law decrees, are
drawn toward the guilty."1 Disturbed by this confrontation with an
unidentified guilt, K. nevertheless rejects any attempt at "a quick
solution in favor of . . . that certainty which the natural course of
things would be bound to bring."16
From this point forward, K. moves toward his demise. Significantly, his arrest at no time results in physical imprisonment. He is
merely told that he "has a trial." He is never informed of the charge
against him, nor given any opportunity to address his accusers. Thus
confronted, K. becomes obsessed with clearing his name. His attempts
to do so comprise the body of the novel. On his thirty-first birthday,
exactly one year after his arrest, K. is led out into the street and
executed. The novel ends.
At the novel's inception, Joseph K. is arguably a modern day
Everyman. He has enough to eat, a place to sleep, and regular, if
passionless, sexual relations. Beyond a mild desire for personal social
advancement, he is content. Insofar as it jars him out of this perfectly
mundane existence (so familiar to the 1980's), K.'s arrest is as much a
blessing as a curse. Normally, one who does not choose to undertake
self-examination is left in whatever peace resides in an unexamined
life. K., however, is forced to question his own existence. His trial
reveals the emptiness of that existence. By demanding that K. reflect
upon the meaning of his being, his accusers paradoxically grace him
with the opportunity to choose life over death. 17
The paradox is completely lost on K. He is asked to examine
himself and discover a reason for guilt in his life, 18 and fails miserably.
Having never taken responsibility for his own development, K. is
almost entirely a product of the world around him. He attempts to
'5

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11. K's reaction makes clear that, as critic James Rolleston observes, he has been
I6

"caught in the middle of an unreflecting life." ROLLESTON, KAFIA's NARRATIVE THEATER 75
(1974). Rolleston also suggests that, at the time of K's arrest, he "is somewhat detached from his
own life, that he goes along with the values of society because he has nothing to put in their
place.
...
Id. at 73.
7 Professor Walter Sokel takes the view that as "the self that is to be examined is living and
continuous and constantly adds new acts and aspects to itself during the very process of selfevaluation . . . [o]nly death can put an end to the process that is the trial." Sokel, Oedipal and
Existential Meanings of The Trial, in ON KAFKA: SEMI-CENTENARY PEasPEC'rivEs 2,5 (1976). In

this sense, however, every examined life is a trial. It is K's failure to appreciate the positive
connotations of self-confrontation that makes him shrink from the responsibilities inherent
therein.
" See generally Sokel, supra note 17. Professor Sokel deals extensively with the question of
guilt in THE TRIAL.
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force a confrontation with his accusers because his existence depends
upon an external view of himself. When K.'s world turns against him,
his life becomes a fruitless search for affirmation.
K.'s reaction to his trial reflects Kafka's dark view of humanity.
K. cannot heed an explicit life or death command to confront himself
and develop an individual identity. As he descends into death, his
groping nonexistence is set against the experience of those he encounters. Most notably, K. meets a man who tells him, "I am here to whip
people; and whip them I shall."' 9 Unquestioning and value neutral,
the whipper embodies the horror of abdicating self-identification in
favor of external definition. Through this character, one critic notes,
"Kafka . . . shows a man's profession as his exclusive mode of existence, and man as completely swallowed up by it." 20 The whipper
derives his meaning from an external perception of himself. He can no
longer exist apart from his role as whipper.
Ironically, K. is disturbed by the whipper's blind devotion to his
profession. He fails to see in the whipper a mirror image of himself,
devoid of a self-realized identity. One of the keys to The Trial is K.'s
failure to appreciate his own absolute dependence upon an external
perception of himself. Tragically, he has successfully repressed any
desire to reach beyond the confines of his immediate existence. He has
acquiesced to a life predicated upon his perception of what society
expects of him. He has never confronted himself and examined his
being and its significance-or insignificance.
Max Brod, Kafka's close friend and confidant, described the
author's "fundamental principle: pity for mankind that finds it so
hard a task to do what is right. 12 ' K. is a fitting object of such pity.
Arbitrarily put on trial, he accepts the role ascribed to him and
becomes determined to prove his innocence. Unable to see that "[i]nnocence is an inner certainty which is not in need of external confron-

11F.

KAFKA, supra note 5, at 107.

20 G. ANDERS, FRANZ KAFKA 48 (1960). Professor Anders continues:

[Wihat a man "really" is-the question despairingly asked by existentialism-Kafka
neither asks or answers, simply because there is no room for this "real" person in the
"'professional" world he describes. Imperator somnians imperator: the emperor is
emperor even while he sleeps. Kafka makes this identification of man and profession
in the modern world absurdly obvious, by inventing absurd professions; but the
point is no less true-it only does not strike us as abnormal-in the case of everyday
professions ...
Id.
21 M. BROD, FRANZ KAFKA 180 (1960). Brod does not suggest that Kafka had or believed that
he had an absolute sense of that which was right. Rather, he describes Kafka's pity for mankind
as a "half-smiling, half-weeping pity. Not the fulminating excommunication of the 'theology of
the crises' which knows so exactly when mankind has gone wrong." Id. In fact, Brod attests to
the fact that "Kafka's demands on himself were the most severe." Id.
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tation,"22 K. fails to appreciate his power to reject the trial and live as
he chooses to live. Therefore, he willingly takes up his cross and
carries it to his unhappy death.
Toward the novel's end, K. encounters a priest who offers a
parable which reveals the meaning of the trial.
[B]efore the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there
comes a man from the country who begs for admittance to the
Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot admit the man at the
moment. The man, on reflection, asks if he will be allowed, then,
to enter later. "It is possible," answers the doorkeeper, "but not at
this moment .... 23
Although the man from the country did not anticipate such difficulty
in gaining admittance to the Law, which, "he thinks, should be
accessible to every man . . .at all times, . . . he decides that he had
better wait until he gets permission to enter." 24 His wait stretches on
25
"for days and years."
He makes many attempts to be allowed in and wearies the
doorkeeper with his importunity .... In the first years he curses
his evil fate aloud; later, as he grows old, he only mutters to
himself .... Before he dies all that he has experienced during the
whole time of his sojourn condenses in his mind into one question.
., . He beckons the doorkeeper, "What do you want to know
now?" asks the doorkeeper, "you are insatiable." "Everyone strives
to attain the Law," answers the man, "how does it come about,
then, that in all these years no one has come seeking admittance but
me?" The doorkeeper perceives that the man is nearing his end, so
he bellows in his ear: "No one but you could gain admittance
through this door, since this door was intended for you. I am now
2 6
,"
going to shut it ....
K. immediately concludes that the doorkeeper deceived the man in
that he "gave the message of salvation to the man only when it could
27
no longer help him."
"He was not asked the question any earlier," said the priest, "and
you must consider, too, that he was only a doorkeeper, and as such
fulfilled his duty." "What makes you think he fulfilled his duty?"

22
23

24
25
21
27

Sokel, supra note 17, at 11.

F. KAFKA, supra note 4, at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 269-70.
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His duty might have been to keep all strangers away,

but this man, for whom the door was intended, should have been
let in ... "2s
The priest's lesson is in many ways the message of The Trial. The Law
is a metaphor for that which human beings seek to attain: 29 enlightenment, happiness, peace, and ultimately, salvation. In an indifferent
world, each individual bears the responsibility for his own self-development. Abdication of this responsibility invites damnation. One who
cannot look inward cannot realize the full potential of his own being.
The man from the country never gains admission to the Law precisely
30
because he waits for the Law to admit him.
K.'s misinterpretation of the parable underscores his fundamental flaw: a persistent faith in "that certainty which the natural course
of things was bound to bring."'-3 His belief in the man's undeniable
right to enter the Law mirrors his belief in his own undeniable right to
freedom. He fails to perceive the individual's responsibility to decide
what is to become of himself, and to make choices in accord with that
decision. Just as the man from the country seeks an external mandate
of admission to the Law, K. seeks an external mandate of innocence.
Like the man, K. never grasps the need to look inward for direction.
Nevertheless, K. fails to recognize the man as a horrible caricature of
himself, frozen on the brink of true being.
Also like the man from the country, K. never realizes that he
must build his own road to freedom. He refuses to forego his illusory
sense of balance in the universe, although his trial demands that he do

Id. at 270.
See Sokel, supra note 17, at 15. See also infra note 30.
30 According to Professor Sokel:
Entrance into the law is possible only at a definite, unique moment, which the man
allows to pass by unused. The unique moment is linked to the unique individual for
whom alone this entrance is destined. Uniqueness of moment and uniqueness of
person are united in the free decision that is necessary to enter the law. No one else
can make the man's entrance possible since it is his alone, and the one single moment
for it must be seized by him who is to enter. If the doorkeeper were to grant the
entrance, it would not be the man's entrance. It would be a gift bestowed on him by
another or it would be a general right belonging to anyone and everyone. Furthermore, the entrance can truly belong to the man alone only if it results from his own
free decision. Given the absolutely individual nature of the entrance, the man must
lose it from the moment he fails to choose it. We are reminded of Kierkegaard's FAR
AND TREMBLING in which the individual's relation to the Absolute-in terms of
Kafka's parable "the law," i.e., that which everyone strives for-can only be individual, i.e., completely and utterly unique.
2

29

Id.

3'See F. KAFKA, supra note 5, at 11; see also supra note 16.
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so. Unlike most individuals, who are free to choose the path of least
resistance, K. is forced to examine his individual being. His trial
denies him his comfortable niche in society. K. is asked to determine
where he truly fits in-that place at which he will be in harmony with
the world. He is asked to confront himself and ascertain his real
identity.
In the last analysis, K. has so fully internalized the messages of
the external forces in his life that he cannot be jarred into selfrealization. At the novel's end, he is dragged out and killed " '[1]ike a
dog!,' ''32 still certain there were "arguments in his favor that had
been overlooked." ' 33 K. simply missed the point.
One critic recently observed, "Kafka's work is so specific on the
surface, and so cryptic underneath, that it can serve any interpreter. '34 Moreover, The Trial is a work of multidimensional richness. The foregoing interpretation does not purport to be the definitive reading of this literary masterpiece. It merely highlights three
characters-Joseph K., and through him the whipper and the man
from the country. The experiences of these three characters convey a
symbolic message for lawyers and law students.
K. was being pulled along by the current of life when he was
waylaid by the trial. His vain search for a rational explanation then
became the focal point of his existence. The whipper knew only blind
devotion to his mechanical task. The man from the country spent his
life waiting to be saved. In attempting to discern the meaning of these
characters, it must be noted that Kafka's legacy lies not in solutions
offered, but in questions presented. 35 The reader does not leave knowing more; he leaves with a better sense of all that remains to be
known. In The Trial, Kafka gives no prescription for avoiding the
unhappy fate of either K., the whipper, or the man from the country.
While the reader is tempted to dismiss this as a function of the author's
own unhappiness, it may be that Kafka's inability to fashion a formula for the world's sorrow was more the cause than the result of his
pain.
Whatever the reason, insofar as The Trial depicts the failure of
individuals to take responsibility for their own destinies, it is fitting
that it offers no explicit answers. Individuals must identify their own
values, and take responsibility for the implementation of these values.
32

F. KAFKA, supra note 5, at 286.

33

Id.

" Kantor, The Malady Was Life Itself (Book Review), Time, July 18, 1983, at 64.
35 Henel, The Legend of the Doorkeeper, in TWENTIETH CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS
TRIAL 48 (1976).

OF THE

120

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:110

For the law student, living up to this responsibility involves incorporating a knowledge of the law into a carefully developed value structure. For the attorney, it involves practicing or teaching law not as a
trade, but as a principled profession rooted in sound theory and
committed to public service.
If attorneys are to occupy a highly respected social position, they
must conduct the profession with respect, both for one another and for
the society they serve. Perhaps most important, each attorney must
faithfully adhere to his own conception of right and wrong. If, as
Holmes believed, one "may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere, '36 professional responsibility must begin with the self.
Kevin H. Marino
6

(1913).
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